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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
THOMAS LAYTON MASTBAUM 
and KATHLEEN MARIE MASTBAUM, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. 19779 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the decision of the First 
Judicial District Court granting plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, concluding that plaintiff, as a matter of law, has no 
responsibility to defend its insured, Mr. Mastbaum, against a 
negligence action brought by his wife. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on 
the grounds that (1) the negligence action was barred by the 
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, and (2) that the policy's 
family exclusion clause is not violative of public policy or the 
policy behind the Utah Safety Responsibility Act. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the Order of Summary Judgment 
affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants, Thomas Layton Mastbaum and Kathleen Marie 
Mastbaum, are husband and wife, and are residents of Cache 
County, Utah. On May 30, 1981, defendants were returning to 
their home in Cache County after spending the day at Bear Lake in 
Rich County, Utah. Shortly after defendants started up Logan 
Canyon, they were involved in an automobile accident. Mrs. 
Mastbaum was injured in this collision and seeks relief from the 
plaintiff, State Farm Mutual, her husband's insurer. 
Section 1, "LIABILITY COVERAGE", of the insurance policy 
involved, specifically provides for certain exclusions. The 
exclusion in question clearly states the following: 
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY UNDER: (h) 
COVERAGE A ["Bodily injury sustained by 
other persons"], TO BODILY INJURY TO ANY 
INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF THE FAMILY OF AN 
INSURED RESIDING IN THE SAME HOUSEHOLD AS 
THE INSURED. (Emphasis contained in 
policy) 
Defendants claim that this exclusion is violative of 
public policy in general, and violative of the public policy 
behind the Utah Safety Responsibility Act, Utah Code Annotated 
§30-2-4, and the Utah Constitution (Article I, Section II). 
Defendants also claim that the doctrine of interspousal tort 
immunity is violative of public policy. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on 
the grounds that (1) the negligence action was barred by the 
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, and (2) that the policy's 
family exclusion clause is not violative of public policy or the 
policy behind the Utah Safety Responsibility Act. (Article I, 
Section II) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
KATHLEEN MARIE MASTBAUM'S SUIT AGAINST HER 
HUSBAND, THOMAS LAYTON MASTBAUM, IS BARRED 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL TORT 
IMMUNITY. 
At common law, it was considered that upon marriage, the 
wife, as the legal entity, merged with her husband; that her per-
son and property became his, that any recovery for injury to her 
belonged to him, that any suit had to be brought in his name. 
Admittedly, the idea of the spouse's legal entity in the husband 
is no longer accepted -- all jurisdictions now grant the wife a 
separate entity from that of her husband. Many jurisdictions 
have taken this idea one step further by abolishing the doctrine 
of interspousal tort immunity. However, this is not the case in 
Utah where the doctrine is currently the law in situations 
involving negligent tortious conduct. 
Utah still adheres to the doctrine of interspousal tort 
immunity in suits involving negligent tortious conduct. In 
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963), the 
Utah Supreme Court noted the two most widely accepted public 
policy grounds for retaining the doctrine: (1) preserving family 
harmony and the solidarity of the family unit, and (2) that "where 
insurance is involved, because of the common interest a spouse 
would have in the outcome, collusion would be encouraged." Id. 
at 390. 
According to the court in Rubalcava, jurisdictions which 
disallow interspousal tort immunity have done so by arguing that: 
Since the insurance company, and not the 
defendant, will have to pay, the family 
exchequer will not suffer so much by 
allowing the action as by denying it, so 
the family harmony will not be harmed but 
may be served by allowing the action. Id, 
at 390-391 . 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected such logic stressing 
that: 
The fact cannot be ignored that where 
there is insurance, and this is known to 
both parties, the temptation to collusion 
exists; and this is increased when the 
supposedly adverse parties are in the sym-
biotic relationship of husband and wife. 
The risk of loss, and the natural reaction 
to defend against the charge of wrong, may 
be negligible or non-existent; and are 
supplanted by the covert hope of mutual 
benefit. I^d. at 391 . 
To further support the above, the Rubalcava court cited Brown v. 
Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953), and quoted Justice Simms as 
stating that to allow interspousal tort actions 
encourages raids on insurance companies 
through unmeritorious claims which never 
would be instituted where the husband did 
not carry liability insurance, thus 
possibly raising insurance rates on 
thousands of honest persons for the bene-
fit of the fraudulent few. Id. 391-392. 
In addressing the argument regarding the disruption of 
family harmony, the Rubalcava court found that because the 
insurance company was in actuality the opposing party, marital 
harmony would not be endangered. In so stating, the court found: 
The argument that domestic felicity will 
not be impaired when the insurance company 
is to pay seems to lose sight of the prin-
ciple that collusion itself is something 
dishonest to be guarded against. We 
assume that it will be agreed that the 
objective of a fair and just determination 
is not to be subverted by providing an 
easy means for a discordant pair to unite 
happily in collusion against a third party 
simply for the sake of marital harmony. 
More fundamental ethical thinking will 
demonstrate that this ultimately would not 
serve the cause of household concord 
anyway. If spouses join in dishonest chi-
canery against the third party, this would 
weaken the foundation of their rela-
tionship because when troubles arise, as 
they always do in marriage, the parties 
would then suspect each other's integrity. 
Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra, at 392. 
Therefore, Rubalcava maintains that public policy argu-
ments strongly favor retention of interspousal tort immunity. In 
addition, the court expressly stated that any changes in this 
important area will have to be made by the legislature. I_d. at 
393. 
A more recent case to challenge Utah's stance on inter-
spousal tort immunity was Hull vs. Silver, 577 P.2d 103 (Utah 
1978). This case involved a wrongful death action filed by the 
administrator of the estate of Marilyn Hull Silver, on behalf of 
Mrs. Silver1s heirs, against the estate of Lynn R. Silver, her 
husband. The couple had been killed when an airplane piloted by 
Mr. Silver had crashed. The trial court granted the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. In 
reversing the trial court's decision, the Utah Supreme Court 
acknowledging it's decision in Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra., 
stated that, "It should be the purpose of the law to protect 
family solidarity... ." However, the court determined that the 
doctrine of interspousal tort immunity would not apply to this 
particular fact situation, in that both spouses were dead and the 
conventional family unit had been destroyed. Because of the 
those facts, "there is no marital harmony that needs protection, 
and there is no possibility of collusion." Hull vs. Silver, 
supra., at 103. Clearly, this is distinguishable from the facts 
of Rubalcava. Thus, the public policy arguments for retaining 
the doctrine still apply in cases where both spouses are alive 
for the preservation of marital harmony and to guard against 
collusion. 
The most recent Utah case to address this issue is 
Stoker vs. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980). This was an action 
brought by a woman against her former husband for injuries 
alleged to have been intentionally inflicted on her prior to the 
divorce of the parties. By a 3 to 2 decision, the court held 
that the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity should not apply 
to intentional torts. However, the court's decision was abro-
gating immunity as to intentional torts only: 
This does not mean that a husband or wife 
can recover from the other for any 
unwanted caress, kiss, or other physical 
contact as sometimes claimed. The 
marriage relation is created by the con-
sent of both of the parties; inherently 
within such relationship is the consent of 
both parties to physical contact with the 
other, personal dealings and ways of 
living which would be unpermitted and in 
some cases unlawful as between other per-
sons. The essential objects and purposes 
of marriage such as living together, 
creating a home and rearing a family are 
expected and consented to by husband and 
wife but would be unlawful and in some 
instances even criminal as between other 
persons. Under some circumstances such 
consent might be withdrawn and thereafter 
would not prevent civil liability from 
occurring, but until that happens the 
ordinary dealings between husband and wife 
are with the consent of both and do not 
create liability between them. However, 
this does not mean that either husband or 
wife consents to intentionally inflicted 
serious personal injuries by the other. 
Id. at 592, citing Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 
404, 408, 275 P.2d 696, 699 (1954) (emphasis 
added) 
Even though this decision did not abrogate interspousal tort 
immunity as to negligent torts, Chief Justice Crockett (joined by 
Justice Hall) in the dissenting opinion indicated that the 
decision nonetheless "constitutes an abrupt change in our law 
which has the potential for far reaching effects." I_d. Chief 
Justice Crockett also echoed the decision in Rubalcava v. 
Gisseman, supra, that if there were to be such a "diametric 
change, it should not be by judicial legislation, but by the 
legislature, whose prerogative and responsibility it is to 
fashion and decide such policies." Id. 
Finally, the dissent wisely pointed out that: 
At the very least, if there is to be a 
change by any means, it should have only 
prospective effect in order to avoid 
disruptive and unjust impact on contrac-
tual obligations and insurance programs 
which have been entered into based upon 
the present state of our law. Id. 
Clearly, Utah has retained the doctrine of interspousal 
tort immunity, carving out an exception only for intentional 
torts. 
Utah has followed those jurisdictions which have chosen 
to decide the issue on a case-by-case basis rather than complete-
ly abolishing the doctrine. Patrons Mutual Ins. Assoc, v. 
Norwood, 647 P.2d 1335 (Kan. 1982), is an example of this 
approach. 
Patrons involved an automobile accident in which the 
husband brought suit against his wife. The husband made a claim 
for uninsured motorist protection, arguing his wife, although 
insured, was uninsured as to him because of interspousal immu-
nity. In his petition for declaratory judgment, the district 
court found that Charles Norwood was a passenger and that he was 
legally entitled to bring an action against Patrons Mutual 
Insurance pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions of the 
policy. Subsequently, Patrons appealed. The issue was, "whether 
the Kansas doctrine of interspousal immunity precludes recovery 
of damages by a husband for personal injuries suffered in an 
automobile accident caused by his wife's negligence where such 
recovery is sought under the uninsured motorist provisions of a 
liability policy issued to his wife." I_d. at 1336. 
In determining this issue, the court dealt with an 
interpretation of the "legally entitled to recover" provision of 
both the insurance policy and a Kansas statute. In so dealing, 
the court found, "Before an insured can recover under the unin-
sured motorist provisions of the insurance policy, that person 
must show he or she is flegally entitled to recover1 damages from 
the uninsured motorist." The court then went on to construe the 
phrase, "legally entitled to recover as damages" to mean: 
[T]he insured must be able to establish 
fault on the part of the uninsured 
motorist which gives rise to damages and 
to prove the extent of those damages. 
This would mean that in a direct action 
against the insurer the insured has the 
burden of proving that the other motorist 
was uninsured, and the amount of this 
liability. In resisting the claim the 
insurer would have available to it, in 
addition to policy defenses compatible 
with the statute, the substantive defenses 
that would have been available to the 
uninsured motorist such as contributory 
negligence, etc. _^d. at 1338* 
Before reaching the issue of interspousal tort immunity, 
this court examined the public policy reasons behind uninsured 
motorist coverage and found: 
If the purpose of the uninsured motorist 
statute is to afford the same protection 
to a person injured by an uninsured 
motorist as he or she would have enjoyed 
if the offending motorist had carried 
liability insurance, it makes sense to 
deny [the husband's] claim. Under the 
doctrine of interspousal immunity he could 
not have recovered from his wife regard-
less of whether she carried liability 
insurance." Ld. 1340. 
The court then reasoned: 
[T]he foremost justification for immunity 
is based on the premise that personal tort 
actions between husband and wife would 
disrupt and destroy the peace and harmony 
of the home and this would be contrary to 
the public policy of the state. I_d. 1340. 
Subsequently, "in balancing the public policy of pro-
viding liability insurance coverage for all drivers against that 
of preserving the peace and harmony of the home the court found 
the former must give way.11 Therefore, the court concluded that 
the husband was not legally entitled to "recover" damages from 
his spouse and that the uninsured motorist provision of her 
insurance policy did not apply. 
Utah has chosen not to follow those jurisdictions which 
have completely abolished the doctrine of interspousal immunity, 
chosing rather to apply the doctrine in those cases where there 
are strong policy reasons for retaining it. 
The situation that lends itself most to the retention 
of the doctrine is in those cases where both parties have an 
interest in collecting insurance. 
The present case is an example of the type of case where 
the doctrine should be retained. Mr. and Mrs. Mastbaum both have 
a direct economic interest in recovering from State Farm. Thus, 
there can be no true adversary proceeding in determining the 
issues of liabiLity or damages. It is to Mr. Mastbaum1s interest 
to agree with his wife's position and to do everything possible 
to see that she recovers the highest judgment available. 
This is already evident in the present case. Mr. 
Mastbaum filed an affidavit in the lower court admitting all of 
the elements sufficient to overcome the guest statute defense 
which was in effect at the time of this accident. Thus, because 
Mr. Mastbaum will benefit from any judgment his wife is seeking, 
he is really an adversary to his own defense and to the insurance 
company that would be obligated to provide the same if the 
doctrine of interspousal immunity and the household exclusion of 
the policy are not given validity. 
It is not enough to say that our court system can 
resolve such issues. That proposition ignores reality. The 
legal system is founded upon its adversarial nature. Without 
which, the checks and balances necessary for justice are lost. 
In realty the insurance company which would be required to defend 
Mr. Mastbaum would be denied his cooperation, therefore sub-
verting justice. 
POINT II. 
THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE CONTAINED IN 
PLAINTIFF'S INSURANCE POLICY IS A VALID 
AND ENFORCEABLE PROVISION AND DOES NOT 
VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY UNDER UTAH LAW. 
Whether family exclusion clauses provided for in 
liability insurance policies violate public policy has been 
answered directly by the Utah Supreme Court. In State Farm 
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kay, 26 Utah 2d 195, 487 P.2d 852 
(1971), the plaintiff, State Farm Mutual, initiated a declaratory 
judgment action to determine its liability and duty to afford a 
defense to its insured, Myrtle L. Kay, under an automobile 
liability policy. Mrs. Kay had been the driver in a one car 
rollover in which her son, Richard Kay, had been severely 
injured. As had been done in the present action, Mr. Kay 
asserted that the family exclusion clause was void as a matter of 
public policy. In rejecting this claim, the court quoted exten-
sively from a factually similar case, State Farm Mutual Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 2 Wash.App. 169, 467 P.2d 189, 193-194 
(1970): 
The majority rule upholds the validity and 
application of exclusionary provisions in 
factual situations substantially similar 
to the facts in the present case. See 50 
A.L.R.2d 108, at 120; 50 A.L.R.2d 110, 
Later Case Service. A review of the 
numerous cases therein cited leads this 
court to the conclusion that in con-
sidering the construction of any exclu-
sionary clause in a liability insurance 
policy, the purpose and intent of the 
insurer in inserting the particular clause 
must be considered. The exclusion in 
question is a so-called 'household or 
family exclusionary clause,1 the purpose 
of which is not to protect insurers from 
collusion which might possibly arise in 
intrafamily suits, but also to protect 
them from the natural tendency of one 
insured to strengthen or enlarge the case 
against him when it involves members of 
his household and family. There is a 
natural disposition to favor those in 
one's household and close members of one's 
family. The practical impossibility 
facing an insurer in defending such an 
action is readily apparent, and explains 
why this type of exclusion is inserted in 
a policy . . . . at 856. 
Based on the above, the court in State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Kay, supra, at 856, held that Richard Kay was within the 
exclusionary clause, which does not violate public policy. 
Following this decision, Richard Kay then sued his 
mother, and joined the insurer based on the uninsured motorist 
clause of the policy. The Utah Supreme Court again rejected 
Kay's claim and, in Kay v. Kay, 30 Utah 2d 94, 513 P.2d 1372 
(1973), explained in even greater detail why the family exclusion 
clause is not violative of public policy: 
State Farm was contractually bound to pro-
vide liability coverage; however, there 
was an exclusion. The household or family 
exclusion is for the purpose of protecting 
insurers from collusion which might arise 
in intrafamily disputes and from the 
natural tendency of the one insured to 
strengthen or enlarge the case against him 
when it involves members of his household 
and family. The practical impossibility 
facing an insurer in defending an action 
of this type explains the necessity of 
including an exclusion in the policy. 
Since there is a valid public policy to 
support this exclusion from liability 
coverage, it would be nonsense for this 
exclusion to constitute a ground to acti-
vate the substituted liability coverage 
under uninsured motorist provisions. Id. 
at 1373. 
Again, as pointed out by the coiirt, the exclusion does 
not violate public policy; on the contrary, it served two very 
important public policies. First, it helps avoid collusive suits 
arising from intrafamily disputes, and secondly, it protects the 
insurer from the impossible burden of defending a tortfeasor who 
is not only related to the plaintiff, but who desires the plain-
tiff to prevail. 
Finally, as stated above, "the majority rule upholds the 
validity and application of exclusionary provisions . . . ." 
State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, supra, citing 50 
A.L.R.2d 108, at 120; see also 50 A.L.R.2d 110, Later Case 
Service for numerous authorities cited. 
POINT III. 
THE HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSION CLAUSE NEITHER 
VIOLATES THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION (ARTICLE I, SECTION II) NOR 
U.C.A. §30-2-4. 
Article I, Section II of the Utah Constitution states as 
follows: 
All courts shall be open, and every per-
son, for an injury done to him and his 
person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unne-
cessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this state, by him-
self or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
However, this is not a green light for a person to seek 
enforcement of every conceivable remedy. Even though Article I, 
Section II does provide that "all courts shall be open11 a limita-
tion is also included that remedies can only be had "by due 
course of law." The fact that past judicial decisions in this 
state have limited access to the courts in several areas of the 
law is too obvious to justify prolonged decision. However, some 
examples of such limitations are no-fault insurance cases (see, 
e.g., Allstate Ens. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980); 
Workers Compensation Cases (see, e.g., State Tax Comm. v. Dept. 
of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1978); and cases involving a 
statute of limitations (see, e.g., Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 
(Utah 1978). 
The Utah Supreme Court explained Article I, Section II 
in Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366 (1915), as follows: 
This [Article I, Section II] is the 
general provision, which in the same or 
similar language will be found in the 
constitutions of at least 29 states in the 
Union, . . The courts have, however, 
always considered and treated those provi-
sions, not as creating new rights, or as 
giving new remedies where none otherwise 
are given, but as placing a limitation 
upon the legislature to prevent that 
branch of the state government from 
closing the doors of the court against any 
person who has a legal right which is 
enforceable in accordance with some known 
remedy. Where no right of action is 
given, however, or no remedy exists, 
under either common law or some statute, 
those constitutional provisions create 
none. Id. at 366-367. (emphasis added) 
This interpretation is still accepted today. Since no 
such remedy as here sought existed at common law, and since the 
legislature has not created any such remedy or right, this sec-
tion of the Constitution is wholly inapplicable to the present 
action. 
U.C.A. §30-2-4, which defendant also relies upon, pro-
vides as follows: 
A wife may receive the wages for her per-
sonal labor, maintain an action therefor 
in her own name and hold the same in her 
own right, and may prosecute and defend 
all actions for the preservation and 
protection of her rights and property as 
if unmarried. There shall be no right of 
recovery by the husband on account of per-
sonal injury or wrong to his wife, or for 
expenses connected therewith, but the wife 
may recover against a third person for 
such injury or wrong as if unmarried, and 
such recovery shall include expenses of 
medical treatment and other expenses paid 
or assumed by the husband. 
Again, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed this issue 
-1 R_ 
in relationship to exclusion clauses. In Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 
supra, the court explained that: 
[Section 4], which states that she may 
'prosecute and defend all actions for the 
preservation and protection of her rights 
and property as if unmarried,1 provides 
the foundation for the action. However, 
careful reading shows that . . . [this 
section] is referring only to her wages 
and property rights. Following this 
authorization the latter section refers to 
the right of recovery for injury to her 
person: 
'There shall be no right of recovery by 
the husband on account of personal injury 
or wrong to his wife. . . but the wife 
may recover against the third person for 
such injury or wrong as if unmarried. . . 
.' [As in original] This language simply 
takes from the husband the right of action 
for injury to the wife and gives it to 
her. Since the husband and wife are the 
only two persons mentioned, the authoriza-
tion of the wife to recover 'against the 
third person' can only reasonably be 
interpreted as against someone other than 
the husband. We are unable to find in 
this section, either expressly or by 
implication, any authority for the wife to 
sue her husband in tort. But as we read 
the language, its plain import is to the 
contrary; and the authorization to sue a 
third person clearly manifests that the 
section was formulated in an awareness 
that no right to sue the husband existed. 
Id. 393. (emphasis added) 
Some confusion on this issue was recently created in 
Stoker v. Stoker, supra. After citing U.C.A. §30-2-4, the court 
stated that: 
The statute authorizes her to prosecute 
and defend all actions for the preser-
vation and protection of her rights and 
property, as if unmarried. It speaks of 
rights and of property in the disjunctive, 
_i £_ 
and, all actions for the preservation and 
protection of her rights would certainly 
include a right to be free from an inten-
tional tort of her husband. Ijl. 591 • 
Even though this section was only cited as support for the propo-
sition that a wife can sue her husband for an intentional tort, 
Chief Justice Crockett (with Justice Hall concurring) stated the 
following in the dissenting opinion: 
It is my opinion that one will search in 
vain for any authorization for a wife to 
sue her husband in a tort claim. 
* * * 
It is significant to focus attention 
upon the fact, that in prescribing the 
rights the wife has to recover on account 
of personal injuries, the just quoted sec-
tion [30-2-4] mentions both husband and 
wife; and that it authorizes the latter to 
recover only against a third person, 
pointedly omitting any reference to suing 
the husband. Equally important and per-
suasive, it does nothing about authorizing 
the husband to sue a wife. Under the main 
opinion's reasoning, this statute leaves 
an illogical and unjust hiatus in the law. 
It could hardly be more obvious than that 
no such incongruous result was intended; 
and that the plain meaning and intent is 
to authorize a suit only as against a 
third person and has nothing to do with 
authorizing a suit against the husband. 
Chief Justice Crockett then concluded that: 
If the legislature had intended to create 
a cause of action, or to recognize the 
right of a wife to sue her husband in 
tort, it would and should have done so in 
those statutes which specifically set 
forth each of the several rights which the 
wife does have to bring such suits for the 
protection of her interests, her person, 
and her property. In the absence of 
having done so, it is to my mind inesca-
pably clear that there is no such statu-
tory authority for the wife to maintain 
such a cause of action against her hus-
band. I_cL 593, 594. (emphasis added) 
This opinion has been supported by most states that 
adhere to the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. Most of 
these jurisdictions have followed the general principle mentioned 
by Chief Justice Crockett that statutes are not deemed to repeal 
the common law unless the legislative intent to do so is clearly 
manifested. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 187 P.2d 572 
(1955). See also, 92 A.L.R.3d 901 at 912 to 917 for extensive 
citing from other jurisdictions. 
Stoker v. Stoker, supra, must be applied to the limited 
fact situation of that case; that of an intentionally inflicted 
tort. The reasoning for this is obvious -- where the peace and 
harmony of a home have already been strained to the point that a 
physical attack could take place, domestic tranquility and family 
solidarity would not be further impaired by allowing a suit to be 
brought to recover damages for the attack. 
However, the same reasoning does not apply to negligent 
torts. As in the present case, tortious acts stemming from 
negligence can, and very often do, occur in homes where there is 
marital harmony and domestic tranquility to protect. In short, 
the public policy considerations, and thus the laws which should 
be applied are completely different when comparing intentional 
and negligent torts. 
The determination of this issue will be important not 
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only for automobile liability cases but also in other negligence 
actions where the insurance policies have family exclusion provi-
sions. Most homeowner policies have similar exclusions and since 
a majority of accidents occur in the home, a decision striking 
the exclusion would have far reaching and very serious conse-
quences -- should there be tort lability among family members for 
such common "negligence11 as failing to properly remove snow and 
ice from sidewalks? It is submitted that the first party bene-
fits now available in existing insurance contracts are sufficient 
protection for family members. The legislature has wisely chosen 
not to expand the rights of family members to include the pro-
posed tort liability because the adversary system is not pre-
served in such a case as explained earlier in this brief. 
POINT IV. 
THE FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSE INVOLVED DOES 
NOT VIOLATE THE PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE 
UTAH SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY ACT. 
Defendant has claimed that the household exclusion 
clause violates the public policy behind the Utah Safety 
Responsibility Act. Presumably, this assertion stems from 
§41-12-21.1 U.C.A. (1953, as amended), which provides that: 
Commencing on July 1, 1967, no automobile 
liability insurance policy . . . shall be 
delivered . . . unless coverage is pro-
vided in such policy or supplement to it, 
in limits for bodily injury or death set 
forth in Section 41-12-5, under provisions 
filed with and approved by the State 
Insurance Commission for the protection of 
persons insured thereunder who are legally 
entitled to recover damages from owners or 
operators of uninsured motor vehicles. . . 
because of bodily injury . . . resulting 
therefrom. . . . 
However, in Kay v. Kay, supra, the Utah Supreme Court, 
after noting that the insurance company was contractually bound 
to provide liability insurance, then pointed out that: 
Since there is a valid public policy to 
support this exclusion from liability 
coverage, it would be nonsense for this 
exclusion to constitute a ground to acti-
vate the substituted liability coverage 
under the uninsured motorist provisions. 
The uninsured motorist coverage would 
become a device to nullify household 
exclusion clauses. There is nothing in 
the Safety Responsibility Act that man-
dates such a result. Id. at 1373. 
"("emphasis added) 
Other jurisdictions have also held that household exclu-
sions are valid as against the contention that they violate 
financial responsibility laws. See, e.g., Linehan v. Alkahabbaz, 
398 So.2d 989 (Fla.App. 1981); Porter v. Farmer's Ins. Co., 102 
Idaho 132, 627 P.2d 311 (1981). However, courts are admittedly 
divided on this issue. 
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co., 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court 
did hold that a named driver exclusionary endorsement to an auto-
mobile liability policy was void and unenforceable to the extent 
of the mandatory statutory minimum insurance coverage of $15,000 
provided in the Utah Safety Responsibility Act, but was otherwise 
enforceable. The public policy reasons supporting the household 
exclusion provision are, of course, substantially different than 
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the named driver exclusionary endorsement. Thus, the foregoing 
Allstate decision is not dispositive of the present case. 
It is clear from the wording in §41-12-21.1 that the 
purpose of that section is to protect the public in general from 
uninsured motorists and not to protect a person from his or her 
spouse whose policy contains the household exclusion clause. 
There is, however, some plausibility to the argument that if a 
household exclusion clause is enforced, the passenger would be 
excluded from the policy and thus, as to him, the driver would be 
an uninsured motorist. 
This is much the same situation as existed in Kay v. 
Kay, supra. In a concurring opinion in that case, Justice 
Crockett acknowledged the apparent conflict raised by this argu-
ment: On the one hand, the extension of coverage to passengers 
injured by an "uninsured motorist," on the other hand, the exclu-
sion of family members, Justice Crockett explained that: 
The problem to be confronted and resolved 
here is: which of the two provisions 
stated above should be given priority. In 
order to determine that question it is 
proper to look at the entire contract; and 
which provisions appear to be overlapping 
or in conflict, to give them weight and 
priority in accordance with the main 
thrust and purpose of the contract; and 
this sometimes involves consideration of 
public policy. [citations omitted] 
We should proceed upon the assumption, 
as noted above, that the main purpose of 
the taking out and issuance of the policy 
was that Myrtle Kay would be an "insured 
motorist;" and that she in fact had in 
force a policy in conformity with the law. 
The exclusion as to coverage as to members 
of the family is an essential and well 
justified exclusion, for reasons stated in 
the main opinion. As compared to this: 
The coverage for injury caused by an 
"uninsured motorist11 is a comparably recent 
innovation in insurance and in law, and its 
general purpose was to extend insurance to 
take care of injuries resulting from acci-
dents with other cars where there was no 
insurance coverage. If the plaintiff's 
contention were accepted, it would result 
in this extension of coverage defeating 
the primary purpose of the policy which 
was to make his mother Myrtle Kay an 
"insured motorist," and would render 
meaningless the reasonable and justified 
exception as to "members of the family." 
Id. at 1374. (emphasis added) 
As in the Kay case, further weight and persuasion is 
given to this conclusion in the present case in that the policy 
involved clearly provides in the "definitions" section that: 
. . . The term uninsured motor vehicle 
shall not include: (i) a vehicle defined 
herein as an insured motor vehicle . . . . 
The car which was driven by the insured, Thomas Mastbaum, is the 
automobile described in his policy as the insured vehicle. 
Justice Crockett concluded that: 
It is ray judgment that when the entire 
picture is analyzed in the light of what 
has been said in the main opinion, and in 
this supplement thereto, it cannot reason-
ably be concluded from the insurance 
contract that the "uninsured motorist" 
extended coverage was intended to defeat 
the main purpose of the policy: That of 
making the primary insured, Myrtle Kay, an 
"insured motorist" nor of obviating the 
express exclusion as to the members of the 
family. I_d. at 1375. 
This same reasoning is directly applicable to the present case. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the doctrine of interspousal tort 
immunity bars Mrs. Mastbaumfs suit against her husband. The 
public policy grounds for retention of this principle are clearly 
applicable in the present case. Also, as discussed herein, the 
family exclusion clause contained in defendant's insurance policy 
neither violates legislative pronouncement nor judicial prece-
dent. Indeed, past judicial decisions have clearly indicated 
that such exclusions are valid and enforceable contractual 
agreements. Furthermore, the public policy grounds supporting 
retention of the exclusionary clause clearly outweighs any detri-
mental effect which it might have. For these reasons, this court 
should retain the rule upholding enforceability of the household 
and family exclusion clause. 
Based on the undisputed facts of this case and the argu-
ments stated herein, plaintiff prays that the ruling of the 
district court be affirmed. 
Dated this / 7 day of J^ttf/ 1984. 
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